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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STA'fE OF UTAH 
dENNE~T LEASING CO., A UTAH 
Corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Re~;pondent, 
~ALKER REALTY INC., A Utah 
Corporation, and RALPH WALKER, 
an individual, 
vs. 
Defendants,Third 
party Plantiffs and 
Respondents, 
~.K. KOMPUTER CORPORATION, A 
c,')rporation, 
Third party Defen-
dant and Appellant. 
Case No. 16458 
BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
Appeal from judgment of the First Judicial District 
Jf the StRte of Utah, in and for the County of Cache 
Honorable Venoy Christofferson, Judge 
St pru:cn 1·1. "'cirr, Esq. 
?O -2fith Street, .Suite 34 
2~ en, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Third Pa~ty 
Gefeniant-Appellant 
W. Scott Barrett 
BARRETT & MATHEWS 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Third Party 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNETT LEASING CO., A Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
WALKER REALTY INC., A Utah ) 
Corporation, and RALPH WALKER, ) 
an individual, ) 
Defendants, Third ) 
Party Plaintiffs ) Case No. 16458 
and Respondents, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
M.K. KOMPUTER CORPORATION, A ) 
C'.lrporation, ) 
Third Party ) 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants on a 
lease agreement. Defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against 
~.K. Komputer Corporation asking for indemnification if they 
were found liable on the lease. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Third Party Plaintif'f-Respondants agree with the statement 
of the disposition of the lower Court in the Third Party 
Defendants brief with the additional statement that the judgment 
of Bennett Leasing company has now been satisfied by Defendants 
and Third Party Plaintiffs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Third Party Plaintiff-Respondants ask that the 
decision of the District Court be affirmed and that Respo d n ants 
be awarded damage;., and attorneys fees pursuant to the stipu-
lations of the parties, the pleadings, and Rule 76(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. 
STATEMEN'r OF FAC.TS 
Third Party Defendants-Appellant (hereinafter referred 
to as M.K.) first contacted Third Party Plaintiff-Respondent 
(hereinafter referred to as Walker) and induced Walker to 
sign a purchase invoice for a computer machine. (T.p. 7) 
M.K. thereafter arranged the lease with Plaintiff Bennett. 
(hereafter referred to as Bennett) Bennett had no contact 
whatsoever with Walker. (T. p. 8, 37). 
The M.K. salesman represented that there would be an 
unconditional 90-day buy back agreement but that it could not 
be put in writing on the original purchasing agreement because 
it had to go to Bennett and Bennett would not make the lease 
under those conditions. (T. pp-38-39). However, the sales-
!Tian did write "90-day" on the sales invoice and this was con-
strued by Mr. Morris, an officer of M.K. to mean that there 11as 
a 90-day buy back guarantee. (T.p. 79). 
Thereafter Walker wrote to ILK. and asked for a written 
buy back agreement. (T. ppp. 66-67) (Tl.ex.6). Thereafter on 
or about Hovember 11, 1977 the president of M.K. signed a bUY 
back agreement imposing numerous conditions. An officer of 
M.K. testified that this was delivered to Walker but he was not 
-2-
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asked to sign it. Walker testified that he never saw the 
written buy back agreement before the deposition of Mr. Morris 
"':is taken. (T.pp.43,62,96) Walker also testified that there 
were no conditions on the buy back guarantee except for payment 
for time actually used. (T. p. 44) 
Thereafter Walker wrote numerous letters to M.K. none of 
·11 hich were ever responded to in writing. (T. pp.87, 173) 
AalKer testified that even had he seen the written buy back 
agreement prepared on November 11, 1977 he would not have 
signed it because of the conditions stated therein in favor 
of i·l, K. ( T. P. 175) 
Although the written buy back agreement contained con-
ditions favorable to M.K. their officers testified that ·even 
though the buyers name was on it that he didn't have to sign 
it unless he wanted to. (T,pp. 138-139, 141). 
After writing a letter on January 20, 1978 asking that 
the machine be taken back by M.K. Walker received a phone call 
from the president of M.K. agreeing to a 30-day extension of 
the buy back. (T.p. 173) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
TEE GIST OF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS BREACH OF CONTRACT AND 
.~ CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION. 
M.K.'s primary thrust in an attempt to get a reversal of the 
~Jurts judgment is that they were somehow deceived by the court 
awarjing judgment on a different theory than stated in the Third 
-3-
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Party Complaint. This contention is frivolous and co,upletelJ 
unsupported by the Third Party Complaint and Thfrd Party De. 
fendants answer thereto. 
An examination of the Third Party Complaint shows that 
Walker entered into the lease agreements only with the under·-
standing that there was a 90-day termination guarantee, ~t 
for that guarantee he would not have entered into a lease agr,. 
!':lent. Based upon that Walker pleaded that if he be required. 
perform under the Lease agreement that he be awarded indemni:':. 
cation damages against M.K. 
There is an allegation in paragraph six of Third Party 
Complaint alleging fraud for the purpose of claiming exemplar, 
and punitive damages in the sum of $ 5, 000. 00 This paragrapn 
was of no avail since the court awarded no such damages but 
awarded only indemnification. 
Despite the obvious contract pleading, M.K. in its brief 
goes to great length to conteno that it went in trying to de:·:· 
a fraud action and was not properly aware of the possibility' 
losini; on a contract action. That contention is contradicte~ 
M.K. 's answer to the Third Party Complaint. In that answer"' 
defense is: " Third Party Defendant alleges the defense of ~i: 
performance under the contract." (emphasis added) 
Even the M.K. brief under the heading "Nature of the Cas: 
begins "This is an action based in contract where the Plainti: 
respor1Jent purchased a computer ••• " 
M.Y..'s contention that Walker recovered on a theory not 
pleaded is completely unsupporLed by the pleadings r the re: 
-4-
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The court awarded exactly the relief that was prayed for in 
the Third Party Complaint i.e. that if Walker was required 
to comply with the lease agreement that walker be indemnified 
by judgment against M.K. The only mention of fraud in the 
Third Party Complaint is in connection with a request for pun-
itive and exemplary damages which were not awarded by the court. 
Thus, M.K.'s ~ontention that Walker's judgment is based 
exclusively on contract, while he pleaded only the tort of 
fraud, is not correct. In any event it is clear from the record 
that the case was tried on the theory of contract and no 
objection whatsoever was ever made at the trial by M.K. counsel. 
Where a case is tried on the theory of a contract liability 
it cannot be claimed 6n appeal that recovery should have been 
allowed on the theory of tort liability. 5 Am Jur 2nd U5; 
Stovall vs. Newell 158 Or. 208, 75 P. 2d 346. 
A defect of the pleadings which might have been remedied 
by an amendment if objection had been made cannot ordinarily 
be complained of the first time on review, where there has been 
a trial on the merits. 5 Am Jur 2nd 59. Where a case has been 
tried upon the theory that the issues involved therein were suf-
ficiently raised by the pleadings, the insufficiency of the 
pleadings in that respect cannot be urged in a reviewing court. 
5 Am Jur 2nd 60; Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper Sugar, 74 Utah 24, 
276 P. 659. 
A pleading on which the decision to appeal from is based 
will be liberally construed by the Appellate court in support of 
the decision appealed from, especially where the pleading has not 
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been objected to in the court below or the specific objection 
raised on appeal has not been made in the court below. 5 Am Jur 
2nd 316; Robins vs. Roberts 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS. 
M.K. argues in point 2 of the brief that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support finding number 8. In making that 
argument M.K. assumes that its' written buy back agreement 
binds Walker. It was executed by its president but never execute 
by Walker, nor even seen by Walker until after the trial had 
commenced. Thus, conditions imposed by M.K. unilaterally can 
hardly determine whether or not Walker had complied with the 
agreement. There is considerable conflicting testimony on this 
point but Walker's testimony i~ clear and unequivocal. And 
was believed by the court. 
Walker testified that he never saw the buy back agreement 
before the Morris deposition taken after the litigation cornmencea, 
(T. 43,62,69) Walker also said that there were no buy back 
conditions stated by the salesman except that he would pay a pro·, 
rate amount for the time the mactiine was actually used. (T.p. ~• 
Walker further stated that 1t was represented to him by M.K. 
that they would buy the computer back if he was unhappy with it 
for any reason (T. p. 54-55), 
As a matter of law a written buy back agreement, never 
communicated to the beneficiary of the agreement, which contains' 
con di t i'.Jns favorable to the guarantor cannot be binding on the 
beneficiary. 
It is therefore submitted that there was more than sufficier 
evidence to support finding numher 8. 
-6-
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III 
WALKER SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY's FEES, DAMAGES AND COSTS. 
In most jurisdiction the reviewing court may assess a 
penalty or damages on finding that the appeal was taken 
frivolously or for the purpose of hindering or delaying justice. 
5 Am Jur 2nd 447. This is specifically provided for in Rule 76 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure where it is provided 
that the court may award damages that may be just if it finds 
that the appeal was taken for delay. 
In some jurisdictions the award of attorney's fees on 
appeal is within the discretion of the court hearing the appeal 
and this applies in Utah. 5 Arn Jur 2nd 446; Swain vs. Salt Lake 
Real Estate and Investment Company 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 2d 709. 
Although the judgment of the court below is not clear on 
whether or not Walker should have attorney's fees against M.K. 
such fees were prayed for in the Third Party Complaint. Further, 
it was stipulated by all counsel that $1,000.00 was a reasonable 
attorney's fees for the prevailing party or parties. (T. p. 171) 
This should be in addition to the judgment Bennett was 
awarded against Walker plus $1,000.00 attorney's fees for 
Bennetts' attorney. 
While damages will not be awarded for delay where the 
appeal was apparently taken in good faith, an appeal is 
considered to have been taken for purposes of delay, where 
there was no question of law involved and there was evidence 
to sustain the judgrnen~. 5 Arn Jur 2nd 447; Texas and P.R. Co. 
vs. Prater 229 U.S. 177, 57 Led 1139, 33 S. Ct. 637. 
-7-
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that there is no fou-ndation in law 
whatsoever for this appeal. M.K. was fully aware of the 
contractural nature of an indemnification claim which was 
clearly set forth in the Third Party Complaint. M.K. tried 
the case on that theory and made no objections whatsoever to 
the admission of evidence on the theory of breach of contract 
and Walker's right to indemnification. 
There is more than sufficient evidence to support all of 
the findings of fact. The only lack of evidence urged by 
~1.K is conflicting evidence advanced by the M.K. witnesses 
which conflict the trial court resolved in favor of Walker. 
It is therfore respectfully submitted that the judgment 
should be affirmed and that Walker should be entitled to damage: 
and attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this /J , , day of February 1980. 
-8-
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~·· 'G /,-.. ~c:t _,_j2A'1Lii_ 
W. Scott Barrett 
Attorney for Respondent, 
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